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ABSTRACT
Exchange rate policies depend on portfolio choices, and portfolio choices depend on anticipated
exchange rate policies. This opens the door to multiple equilibria in policy regimes. We construct
a model in which agents optimally choose to denominiate their assests and liabilites either in
domestic or in foreign currency. The monetary authority optimally chooses to float or to fix the
currency, after portfolios have been chosen. We identify conditions under which both fixing and
floating are equilibrium policies: if agents expect fixing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the
monetary authority validates that expectation; the same happens if agents initially expect floating.
We also show that a flexible exchange rate Pareto-dominates a fixed one. It follows that social
welfare would rise if the monetary authority could precommit to floating.
Andres Velasco








chang@econ.rutgers.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Emerging market countries have trouble letting their exchange rates ￿oat, and
many countries that claim to ￿oat do not deliver on that promise. That is the
conclusion of much recent empirical work, starting with Calvo and Reinhart
(2002) and Stein et al. (1999). The reason, these papers argue,1 is a lethal
mix of dollarization of liabilities and balance sheet eﬀects: if corporate debts
are denominated in dollars while ￿rms depend on local currency revenues (or,
more precisely, corporate revenues increase with the relative price of goods pro-
duced at home), sharp and unexpected changes in relative prices are harmful
to ￿nancial stability. The policy conclusion is that ￿exible exchange rates can
be destabilizing, and therefore emerging market nations would be well advised
to design alternative monetary arrangements, including currency boards and
dollarization.
Such a view has become extremely in￿uential, but even its most ardent
advocates understand that it is only half the story. The claim is that ￿oating is
not feasible given that debts are dollarized. But, presumably, borrowers choose
the amounts of debt to issue as peso and dollar-denominated bonds taking
into account the risk-return characteristics of these securities. Recognizing that
variances and covariances (especially with consumption) should then matter, Ize
and Levy-Yeyati (2003), Ize and Parrado (2003), and Mor￿n and Castro (2003)
have extended standard portfolio theory to model endogenous dollarization in
emerging markets. Their approach, however, takes as given the structure of
shocks and, more importantly for our purposes, monetary and exchange rate
policies.
So the recent debate has emphasized that exchange rate policies depend on
portfolio choices, and also that portfolio choices depend on anticipated exchange
rate policies. The next question is inevitable: what are the implications of this
interaction once both portfolios and exchange rate policy are endogenous? In
particular, what are the resulting policy outcomes? Is there a single outcome,
or several ones? These are the issues that this paper focuses on.
We build an extremely simple model of a small open economy in which do-
mestic residents can borrow internationally by issuing bonds denominated in
both home and foreign currency. The currency composition of debt plays a
nontrivial role because markets are incomplete: bonds are promises to nominal
payoﬀs that can only imperfectly (or not at all) depend on the realization of the
state of nature. We also assume sticky wages. Then monetary and exchange rate
policy matters through two channels: as in textbook models, in the presence of
external shocks, ￿exible exchange rates stabilize labor supply and output at the
expense of making the real exchange rate more volatile; and, as emphasized in
the more recent literature, unexpected changes in the real exchange rate may
aﬀect wealth and exacerbate the volatility of domestic consumption, if domestic
residents are long in one currency and short in the other. As a consequence,
the optimal exchange rate policy chosen by a benevolent central bank depends
1See also Calvo (1999, 2000) and Krugman (1999, 2000)
2on the existence and extent of currency mismatches. But the latter are deter-
mined, in turn, by the optimizing decisions of domestic borrowers and, hence,
by expectations of exchange rate policy.
The equilibrium outcome of this interaction is an exchange rate regime and a
market allocation such that the market allocation is a competitive equilibrium
given the exchange rate regime, and the central bank cannot increase social
welfare by deviating to a diﬀerent exchange regime. We assume that the central
bank chooses the exchange rate regime (whether to ￿x the nominal exchange
rate or to ￿x the domestic price level and let the exchange rate ￿oat) after
debts and wage contracts have been written. Then market expectations about
exchange rate policy play a crucial role in shaping equilibria.
If bonds are non-contingent promises to either home or foreign currency, we
￿nd there is always an equilibrium with ￿oating exchange rates. So, if agents
expect the central bank will ￿oat, they arrange their wage and debt contracts
accordingly; given that, the central bank indeed ￿nds it optimal to ￿oat. But
in some cases there is also an equilibrium with ￿xed exchange rates: if agents
expect ￿xed rates, they choose wages and portfolios that make it optimal for
the central bank to ￿x ex post. That is, we can have multiple equilibria in policy
regimes.
When there are multiple equilibria, they can be Pareto-ranked. We show
that, if utility functions are quadratic or display constant relative risk aversion,
the equilibrium involving ￿exible rates yields higher expected welfare. So if
the economy is in a situation in which there are two equilibrium policy regimes,
and arbitrary expectations cause the ￿xed rates equilibrium to materialize, then
expected welfare will be ineﬃciently low. Welfare would increase if the central
bank could precommit to ￿oat the currency, regardless of the composition of
agents￿ portfolios.
We also study the case in which domestic bonds are indexed to the price of
home output. Equilibrium policy regimes turn out to be harder to pin down.
Still, under some further assumptions we are able to identify conditions for ￿xed
rates and ￿exible rates to be equilibrium policy regimes. Again, there is a range
of parameters for which both regimes occur in equilibrium. In those cases, a
policy of ￿exible rates again delivers higher expected welfare than do ￿xed rates.
Our discussion is close in spirit to that in Chamon and Hausmann (2002). In
that paper, if domestic ￿rms have large dollar liabilities, unexpected changes in
the real exchange rate can drive the ￿rms into costly bankruptcy. The central
bank can react to shocks by allowing the interest rate or the exchange rate
to move. If domestic ￿rms expect a policy of stable exchange rates they will
borrow in dollars, which ex post may cause the monetary authority to validate
such expectations for fear of bankrupting the ￿rms. Hence one can have more
than one equilibrium policy.
Self-validating policy regimes also appear in Corsetti and Pesenti (2002), but
in a very diﬀerent setting. That paper studies price-setting by ￿rms and the
choice of monetary policy by the government. There can be two equilibria. In
one, ￿rms preset prices in domestic currency only, and foreign-currency prices
are determined by the law of one price. Floating exchange rates are then the
3optimal policy regime. In the second equilibrium ￿rms preset prices in local
currency, and a monetary union is the optimal policy choice.
Our policy message here is similar to that in Caballero and Krishnamurty
(2004), who analyze a model in which ￿nancial market imperfections lead agents
to under-provide insurance against liquidity shocks. In that model ￿oating the
exchange rate is powerless to ameliorate shocks once the quantity of insurance
has been chosen, but can help ex ante to induce agents to take greater pre-
cautions against shocks. Hence Caballero and Krishnamurty also argue for
p r e c o m m i t t i n gt oa￿oat, though for reasons very diﬀerent from ours.
The next section outlines the basic model, and section 3 presents the basic
results. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case in which peso bonds are
indexed, while section 5 concludes. Some technical material is delayed to an
appendix.
2 The model
Consider a single-period, small open economy populated by households and
￿rms. The representative household owns the typical ￿rm and receives its prof-
its.
There are two goods, one produced at home and one produced abroad. The
two goods are imperfect substitutes and both tradable. For simplicity, we as-
sume that domestic households consume only the foreign good.
There is a domestic currency, called peso, which is issued by a domestic
central bank. There is also a foreign currency called dollar. Foreign goods have
a constant price of one in terms of dollars, so we speak indistinctly of dollars
and foreign goods.
To ￿nance operations, at the beginning of the period under study home ￿rms
borrow from the world market, here represented by a continuum of risk-neutral
lenders. The key assumption in this section is that the typical ￿rm can borrow
or lend in pesos or dollars. Therefore, the ￿rm￿s optimal borrowing policy
determines the degree of ￿dollarization￿ in the economy, and will be in￿uenced
by the ￿rm￿s expectations about equilibrium prices and the exchange rate. The
latter are determined by the monetary policy chosen by the central bank, which
in turn takes into account the degree of dollarization.
2.1 Firms
The representative ￿rm has access to the technology
Y = AKαL1−α (1)
where 0 < α < 1 and A is a positive parameter. For simplicity, we also assume
that the capital stock K is of ￿xed size. Households are heterogeneous in the
labor services they provide, and the input L is an aggregate of the services of










where we have indexed workers by i in the unit interval, Li denotes the services
purchased from household i,a n dθ > 1 is the elasticity of demand for household
i￿s services.
Let Wi denote the wage charged by worker i and W denote the aggregate
wage, that is, the minimum cost of a unit of the L aggregate, expressed in terms







The ￿rm has no capital to start with, so it must ￿nance capital purchases
by borrowing abroad. To do this, at the beginning of the period, the ￿rm sells
bonds denominated either in pesos (B) or dollars (B∗). A peso (resp. dollar)
bond is a promise to a peso (resp. dollar) at the end of the period. Note that,
in assuming that bond payments cannot be arbitrary functions of the state of
nature, we are imposing market incompleteness, which implies that currency
composition plays a nontrivial role.
We assume that the world interest rate in dollars is zero, so a dollar bond
must sell for one dollar. Letting Q denote the price in dollars of a peso bond, it
follows that
QB + B∗ = K, (3)
End of period ￿rm pro￿t s ,i nd o l l a r s ,a r ed e n o t e db yΠ and given by
SΠ = PY − WL− SB∗ − B, (4)
where S is the exchange rate (in pesos per dollar) and P the peso price of home
output. As usual, we assume that L is chosen at the end of the period, after
uncertainty has been revealed.
Since the ￿rm is owned by the representative household, it is natural to
assume its objective function be E {u0(C)Π}, where u0(C) is the marginal utility
of the household￿s consumption, to be derived below, and E {.} denotes the
expectation at the beginning of the period. Hence the ￿rm chooses B, B∗,a n d










=0 ,( 5 )
and
WL=( 1− α)PY, (6)
which are standard. In particular, 5 characterizes the ￿rm￿s optimal borrowing
policy: issuing an additional unit of peso bonds costs Q dollars at the beginning
of the period, and requires a dollar repayment of 1/S dollars at the end of the
period. At the margin, the expected utility net gain from such issue must be
zero.
52.2 Households
As already mentioned, households provide diﬀerentiated labor services, so each
household enjoys some monopoly power in the labor market. We assume that, at
the beginning of the period, each household sets a wage in pesos, and commits
to satisfy demand forthcoming at that wage at the end of the period. The
household consumes the dollar value of its labor income plus ￿rm pro￿ts.











SCi = SΠ + WiLi (7)
and to the labor demand function 2. The functions u and v satisfy usual as-
sumptions, and θ > 1.






= E {Lv0(L)}, (8)
where we have imposed symmetry and eliminated isubscripts.
2.3 Foreign lenders
Foreign lenders are risk neutral and only care about foreign goods. Hence they
will buy peso bonds if and only if their expected return, in dollars, equals the








Since local residents do not consume home goods, the demand for home output
comes from foreigners. We assume that the value of the foreign demand for
home output is exogenous and given by a random variable X. We assume that
E(X) >Kand that X is the only source of uncertainty in the model. As a
consequence, the demand function is simply given by
PY = SX. (10)
Competitive equilibrium is well de￿ned once monetary policy is given. Before
proceeding to the analysis of policy, note that in any competitive equilibrium
























6The ￿rst equality says that consumption equals the dollar value of output minus
the cost of servicing the foreign debt. But 10 implies that, again in equilibrium,
the dollar value of output is given by X, while the debt burden is equal to the
initial cost of investment (K) minus the capital gains or losses on peso debt
associated with an exchange rate surprise (the last term on the RHS). So in
this model the extent of debt dollarization cannot aﬀect the expected value of
consumption. Dollarization can aﬀect the variability of consumption, but this
depends on the distribution of the exchange rate and, hence, on policy.
3 Equilibrium monetary policy
We restrict attention to two policy alternatives: a ￿xed exchange rate,d e ￿ned
as a policy that keeps S constant, and a ￿exible exchange rate, which keeps
P constant. This section studies the equilibrium outcomes, in particular the
degree of dollarization, under either ￿exible rates and ￿x e dr a t e s .T h e nw ea s k
whether either alternative is an equilibrium policy.
3.1 Competitive equilibrium under a ￿exible exchange rate
As mentioned earlier, ￿exible exchange rates are de￿ned as a regime in which
the price of home output is constant. The resulting outcomes will be denoted
by tildes. Clearly the price level is immaterial, so we normalize ￿ P =1 .
Equilibrium in the labor market (equation 6) reduces to
￿ W ￿ L =( 1− α)￿ Y (12)
But by 1 output is a function only of ￿ L,a n d ￿ W is set in advance. It follows
that both ￿ Y and ￿ L must be constant under ￿exible rates. 2 Intuitively, since
monetary policy stabilizes the price of home output and nominal wages are
preset, the real (product) wage is constant. Hence the marginal product of
labor, labor demand, and output must be constant too.





so the distribution of the exchange rate is given by the distribution of exports X.
In particular, the nominal exchange rate appreciates when exports are higher.























, u0( ￿ C)
￿
=0
2Given ￿ W, ￿ Y and ￿ L are the solution of 1 and 12.
7Equilibrium portfolios are such that the marginal utility of consumption is or-
thogonal to the terms of trade. The ￿rm accomplished this by choosing B and
B∗ so as to make consumption constant. From 11 and the fact that under
￿exible exchange rates ￿ P =1 , consumption is constant if
￿ B = ￿ Y
which is therefore the optimal portfolio allocation. The intuition is straight-
forward. Given that labor eﬀort is constant and so is the wage, the only risk
the household faces is exchange rate risk, which can cause the price of domestic
output in terms of consumption goods to ￿uctuate. The ￿rm eliminates this
risk on behalf of its owner, the household, by borrowing an amount in pesos
equal to the (constant) value of output. This way the household is fully hedged
against (real and nominal) exchange rate risk.
The corresponding constant consumption level is, by 11 and 13,
￿ C = E {X} − K.
So, in equilibrium with ￿exible rates, the household consumes the expected
dollar value of home output minus the cost of capital.




= E {X} >Kis necessary
for consumption to be positive. This means that initially the ￿rm sells peso
bonds with a higher value than its total foreign liability K, and devote some
of the proceeds to buying dollar assets. So the ￿rm becomes a net creditor in
dollars and a net debtor in pesos. This ensures that capital gains obtain when
the exchange rate depreciates, which are the exact circumstances in which the
dollar value of national income is low.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, observe that nominal

























3.2 Is a ￿exible exchange rate an equilibrium policy?
Suppose that for some reason agents expect a policy of ￿oating and set wages and
portfolios accordingly. Given those expectations, will the monetary authority
deliver that policy ex-post? In other words, are expectations of ￿oating self-
validating? To answer these questions, here we consider whether ￿oating is an
equilibrium policy.
For the interaction between endogenous portfolio selection and monetary and
exchange rate policy, the timing of moves is crucial. We assume the following:
the period under analysis start with a contracting stage in which ￿rms issue
3Note that this is not a closed form solution since ￿ L and ￿ Y depend on ￿ W.To obtain ￿ L, ￿ Y
and ￿ W , 1 , 12 and 14 must be solved simultaneously.
8bonds and workers set the value of their nominal wages. Then the central bank
chooses the policy regime, either ￿xed or ￿exible exchange rates. The authorities
take no other action after that. Finally, uncertainty about exports is realized
and production, trade and consumption take place.
We assume that, in choosing the policy regime, the central bank maximizes
t h ew e l f a r eo fi t sr e p r e s e n t a t i v ec i t i z e n . F l o a t i n ge x c h a n g er a t e sa r et h e na n
equilibrium policy if the central bank has no incentive to deviate for ￿xed ex-
change rates, given the portfolios and wage contracts were optimally written in
the expectation of ￿exible rates. 4
A general analysis of equilibrium policies turns out to be very complex. To
simplify, we impose that, if the central bank is to deviate from ￿exible to ￿xed
rates, the deviation must leave the expected dollar value of pesos unchanged at
its pre-deviation level. This restriction is not only for tractability, but also to
focus on domestic policy concerns and abstract from the (better known) time
inconsistency issues associated with foreign debt: it ensures that a deviation
implies no expected expropriation of foreign lenders. This may be justi￿ed by
the existence of costs of international default.
Denote outcomes under a deviation to ￿xed exchange rates by an overbar.

















where the nominal wage rate is that associated with ￿exible rates, since it was
set before the deviation. Using the de￿nition of ﬂ S from 15 in 16 we then obtain
























In words, the deviation to ￿xed exchange rates keeps expected labor supply the
same, but increases the variability of labor eﬀort. The latter obtains because
￿xing the exchange rate means that the price of home output, and hence the
real wage, must ￿uctuate in order to accommodate shocks to export demand.
4This de￿nition of equilibrium policy is the same as in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Stokey
(1991).
9Using 11 and the fact that the deviation keeps 1/ﬂ S at E(1/￿ S), consumption
after a deviation to ￿x e dr a t e si sg i v e nb y
ﬂ C = X − K




= E {X} − K = ￿ C
Hence, the deviation also causes a mean-preserving spread in consumption.
The analysis shows that, by deviating from ￿exible rates to ￿xed rates when
households had expected the former, the monetary authority induces volatility
into labor supply and consumption without changing the expected value of either
variable. Since volatility decreases expected utility, the policymaker can only
decrease expected utility by switching to ￿xed rates. It follows that ￿exible
exchange rates are always an equilibrium policy regime.
3.3 Competitive equilibrium under a ￿xed exchange rate
Now consider a policy of ￿xing the exchange rate at S = ﬂ S =1(we use overbars
to denote ￿xed rates). Then nominal demand reduces to
ﬂ P ﬂ Y = ﬂ SX = X (17)





So labor eﬀort becomes proportional to the demand for home output. Em-
ployment must ￿uctuate since, with ￿xed exchange rates, the price of home
output and the product wage must ￿uctuate to accommodate changes in de-
mand.
Expression 11 for consumption becomes
ﬂ C = X − K. (19)
Home consumption is equal to X minus the constant value of investment. The
reasons is clear from 11: since the exchange rate is ￿xed, home agents experience
no unanticipated capital gains nor losses.
For the same reasons B and B∗ are indeterminate, since bonds in pesos and
dollars are now perfect substitutes. This means that portfolio composition may
be pinned down by other things outside the model.

















103.4 Is a ￿xed exchange rate an equilibrium policy?
To check whether a ￿xed rate is an equilibrium policy, consider a deviation to a




=1 /ﬂ S =1 .
Again, the justi￿cation for the restriction is to ensure that the deviation imposes
no expected expropriation on foreigners.





￿ P ￿ Y
By assumption, the expectation of the LHS after a deviation must equal unity.
But the deviation also implies that both ￿ P and ￿ Y are constant. Hence, taking
expectation on both sides of the preceding equation, and using 10 again, we ￿nd





Applying this to 6 we have that labor supply is given by
￿ L =
(1 − α)￿ SX
ﬂ W
=
(1 − α)E {X}
ﬂ W
.
Comparing this last expression with 18 we see that after a deviation to ￿oating
labor eﬀort is no longer variable, and its mean value does not change. Hence
there is a ￿temptation￿ to abandon ￿xed rates.





=1 . This yields






+ ﬂ B − K. (22)
Hence the eﬀect of the deviation on consumption depends on the degree of dol-





E {X}−K, so the deviation keeps the expected value of consumption constant.
Therefore, expected utility from consumption may increase or fall depending on
the response of the variability of consumption to the deviation.
From 22 we see that after a deviation the variance of consumption must fall
if 0 <B<2E {X}, and it must increase otherwise. If the variance falls, the
policymaker will unambiguously want to deviate, since that would reduce the
variance of both consumption and labor supply while preserving their expected
values. For instance, if (by ￿uke) agents had adopted the portfolio that corre-
sponds to the expectation of ￿exible rates, the variance of consumption after
the switch would fall to zero, and deviating from ￿xed rates would be optimal
for the policymaker.
It follows that a necessary condition for ￿xed rates to an equilibrium policy
is either B<0 or B>2E {X}. The ￿r s tc a s ei sp e r h a p st h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n g
11one: the representative agent has gross assets in pesos and gross debts in dol-
lars. In equilibrium, this currency mismatch makes no diﬀerence to him nor to
lenders. But it deters the government from abandoning ￿xed exchange rates.
Dollarization of liabilities gives rise to fear of ￿oating.
Summarizing: if is either B<0 or B>2E {X},t h es w i t c ht o￿exible rates
induces a mean-preserving spread on consumption relative to ￿xed exchange
rates. Since the deviation keeps labor eﬀort at its mean value under ￿xed rates,
￿xed exchange rates may or may not be an equilibrium. This depends on the
parameters of the model and, in particular, on the utility cost associated with
consumption ￿uctuations relative to labor eﬀort ￿uctuations (determined by the
shape and curvature of u and v). But also, and importantly for our purposes, it
depends on the currency composition of the ￿rm￿s debt, which is not uniquely
pinned down in equilibrium.
If a ￿xed exchange rate is in fact an equilibrium, then there are multiple
equilibria in policy regimes, since ￿exible exchange rates are always an equilib-
rium. In that case, animal spirits play a role: if agents expect ￿xed rates (and
B<0 or B>2E {X}) the government will indeed deliver ￿xed rates; if agents















E {X}(X − K)−ρ
One can then calculate that switching from ￿xed rates to ￿xed rates increases













E(X)(X − K)−ρ¢ Va r(X)
E {X2}
> 0
































> 0 if B<0 or
B>2E {X}. Assuming that either condition holds, ￿xed exchange rates are























For any given ﬂ B, this condition is satis￿ed if either θ or α are close enough to
one.
123.5 Welfare
Our analysis implies that both ￿exible rates and ￿xed exchange rates can be
equilibrium policies in our model. Importantly, they can also be Pareto ranked
when they coexist.
We have already shown that expected consumption must be the same under
both policy regimes, and that ￿exible exchange rates completely stabilize both
consumption and labor eﬀort. However, it is hard to compare the mean value
of labor eﬀort under the two regimes. Hence the welfare ranking may depend
on functional forms and parameter values.
However, there is no ambiguity if utility functions are CRRA or quadratic:
￿exible rates perform better. To see this formally, assume ￿r s tt h a tp r e f e r e n c e s













, ρ > 0, χ > 0.( 2 3 )
Under ￿oating, 14 and 12 yield
￿ L1+χ =( 1− α)u0(E {X} − K)E {X}, (24)
where we have used the fact that with the assumed utility function Lv0(L)=






(E {X} − K)
1−ρ
1 − ρ
− (1 − ψ)






























Comparing 25 and 26 we see that EU￿ex >E U fix. The appendix ana-








We conclude that for two broadly used classes of preferences, the regime with
￿exible exchange rates yields higher expected welfare. In those cases, if both
￿exible and ￿xed rates are equilibrium policy regimes, benevolent policymakers
must endeavor to convince agents that ￿oating will indeed be the chosen policy.
One alternative is to commit to a ￿exible regime. If this is not possible, direct
regulation of portfolios so as to make ￿exible rates optimal ex post could also
be desirable. Recent attempts at ￿de-dollarizing￿ ￿nancial contracts may be
justi￿ed, then, as coordination devices.
134 Indexed bonds
Readers might wonder whether the results on the multiplicity of equilibrium
policy regimes are an arti￿ce of the indeterminacy of portfolios under ￿xed
rates. That is not so, as we show in this section by extending the model to a
menu of assets that ensures that portfolios are always fully determined.
We replace peso bonds with bonds that have payoﬀs indexed to the price
of the domestic good. Such bonds are common in emerging markets. More
precisely, we assume that the representative ￿rm sells dollar bonds and indexed
bonds. An indexed bond is a promise to P pesos at the end of the period.
Rather than developing the model from scratch, we simply write down the
equilibrium conditions that diﬀer from those of the earlier formulation. Foreign
lenders again arbitrage the returns on both kinds of loans, so the initial price of
an indexed bond, in dollars, must equal the expected terms of trade E {P/S}.
The optimal wage setting condition 8 remains the same, while the optimal














=0 ,( 2 7 )
Market clearing is still given by 10, while expression 11 for consumption
becomes












where B now denotes the outstanding number of indexed bonds.
4.1 A ￿exible exchange rate once again
Consider ￿rst a ￿exible rates regime with ￿ P =1 . Assuming that this policy is
credible and indeed carried out, indexed bonds become identical to peso bonds.
Hence the outcomes are just the same as with ￿exible exchange rates in the
model with peso bonds, characterized in subsection 3.1. Notice in particular
that ￿ B = ￿ Y,that is, indexed bonds in the portfolio are equal to the value of
home output.
Indexed bonds do make a diﬀerence, however, in analyzing whether ￿exible
rates are an equilibrium policy regime. Consider the implications of a deviation
towards ￿xed exchange rates. Again to prevent expected expropriation of foreign
lenders, we assume that such a deviation leaves the expected terms of trade,
P/S, unchanged. Using overbars once more to denote the consequences of a














where the last equality follows from 10.
To solve for the consequences of a deviation, note that 6 implies
ﬂ L =
(1 − α)ﬂ SX
￿ W
. (30)




















Taking expectations and using 29 one obtains the nominal exchange rate under
a feasible deviation:







Inserting this value in 31 and simplifying one gets the price level after a devia-
tion:



















Hence a switch from ￿exible rates to ￿xed rates implies a fall in the expected
price of home output. It follows that the expected real wage rises, and expected
labor eﬀort falls. Formally, from 30, 32 and the de￿nition of ￿ Y one can derive















Hence, the deviation to ￿xed rates implies that labor eﬀort becomes variable
but, in contrast with the case of peso bonds, the mean value of labor eﬀort
falls. The reduction in mean labor eﬀort is welfare-improving, making a switch
towards ￿xed rates attractive.5
As in the case of peso bonds, the switch from ￿exible to ￿xed exchange rates
causes a mean-preserving spread in consumption (the proof is similar to the
one in the case of peso bonds and left to the interested reader.) Additional
consumption variability makes expected welfare fall and reduces the desirability
of the deviation, as in the case of peso bonds. However, with indexed bonds,
5The fact that an increase in labor supply is welfare-decreasing might seem surprising,
since the model features imperfect competition in the labor market, which causes equilibrium
labor supply to be too low relative to the planner￿s solution. But in this model the dollar
value of domestic production is given by 10. Hence working more just causes the terms of
t r a d et ot u r na g a i n s tt h ec o u n t r y ,w i t h o u ta n yb e n e ￿t for consumption.
15mean labor eﬀort falls. Flexible rates are an equilibrium if the utility bene￿t
associated with the smaller labor eﬀort is less than the cost associated with
increased variability in both consumption and labor.
As a special case, assume that
v(L)=φL1+χ (35)
where φ > 0 is an arbitrary constant and χ > 0. Assume also that X is lognor-





equals the sign of χ−α.As w i t c hf r o m￿exible rates to ￿xed rates increases or
leaves the same the expected cost of eﬀort if χ ≥ α.S i n c e t h e s w i t c h a l w a y s
causes a mean-preserving spread in consumption, then χ ≥ α is suﬃcient for the
switch to be welfare-decreasing ￿that is, for ￿exible rates to be an equilibrium
policy.
The intuition is that the larger is χ, the larger is the utility cost of the
increased variability of labor eﬀort under a deviation. On the other hand, by
30, a larger α results in smaller ￿uctuations in labor eﬀort in a deviation. So
the cost of a switch from a ￿exible to a ￿xed exchange rate increases with χ and
falls with α.
4.2 A ￿xed exchange rate once again
Consider next the policy of ￿xing the exchange rate at ﬂ S =1 . Condition 18 still
gives labor eﬀort, and 28 implies that








This expression shows that, in contrast with the case of nominal peso bonds,
the currency composition of the debt matters here even with ￿xed exchange
rates. The central bank can peg the nominal exchange rate but not the terms of
trade; if peso bonds are indexed, capital gains and losses depend on the latter.
As a consequence, ﬂ B is not indeterminate. Instead, it must be set to satisfy
the condition 27, which here reduces to
Cov
¡
u0( ﬂ C), ﬂ P
¢
=0











The rest of the analysis turns out to be more diﬃcult than before, so we
a s s u m ef r o mn o wo nt h a tu(C) is quadratic (at least in the relevant range).
Then u0 is linear in C, and the previous expression reduces to
Cov
¡ ﬂ C, ﬂ P
¢
=0
16That is, equilibrium portfolios must be set so that consumption is orthogonal to
the terms of trade. Using the previous expression for ﬂ C one readily ￿nds that






This is intuitive: with quadratic utility, ﬂ B must be chosen to minimize the
variance of consumption which, from 36, is the variance of X − ﬂ B ﬂ P. Hence ﬂ B
is the coeﬃcient of a linear regression of X on ﬂ P.










Replacing 38 in 36 yields equilibrium consumption:
ﬂ C = X − K +
Cov(X,Xα)
Va r(Xα)
[E {Xα} − Xα] (39)
Now consider a deviation to ￿exible rates, imposing once more the restriction









After the deviation, 6 must hold, which together with the production func-
tion yields labor eﬀort:










where ￿ P is the price level after the deviation, to be determined shortly.
Since 10 must hold, ￿ P/￿ S = X/￿ Y . Taking expectations on both sides and


















But this has to be equal to E
' ﬂ P
“
,w h e r e ﬂ P is given by 37. So, taking expecta-
tions in 37, equating the result to the preceding equation and rearranging gives
































17The inequality follows from Jensen￿s inequality. Switching to ￿exible rates sta-
bilizes labor eﬀort, but at a level that is higher than the mean value of L under
￿xed rates. The sum of these two eﬀects on the representative household￿s
welfare is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model.
The eﬀect of the deviation on consumption can be calculated from
￿ C = X − K + ﬂ B
ˆ





Using 10 once more and after some tedious algebra one obtains





[E {X} − X]. (42)







: the deviation leaves
the expected value of consumption unchanged. But the eﬀect on consumption
variance is unclear, although the expressions for ﬂ C and ￿ C reveal that it depends
solely on α and the distribution of X.
4.3 Multiplicity of policy regimes: a special case
When are a ￿xed and a ￿exible exchange rate both equilibrium policy regimes?
We can identify precise conditions for this to happen if X is lognormal and
v is of the form 35, which we assume from now on. Then, as the appendix
shows, a switch from ￿xed rates to ￿exible rates must increase the variance of
consumption. The appendix also shows that the switch increases the expected
cost of eﬀort if α > χ,l e a v e si tt h es a m ei fα = χ, and reduces it otherwise. As a
consequence, α ≥ χ is suﬃcient (not necessary) for ￿xed rates to an equilibrium
policy.
Recall from the discussion at the end of the last subsection that χ ≥ α is
also suﬃcient for ￿exible rates to be an equilibrium policy. It follows that both
￿exible rates and ￿xed rates are equilibrium outcomes if α and χ are suﬃciently
close to each other. Hence, the fact that peso bonds are indexed does not
eliminate the possibility of multiple equilibria in this model.
If both ￿exible rates and ￿xed rates are equilibrium outcomes, the appendix
shows that ﬂ B∗ is larger than ￿ B∗ in absolute value. That is, under ￿xed rates
the ￿rm issues more indexed debt and purchases more dollar assets than under
￿exible rates. Why? The intuition is as follows. Flexible exchange rates stabilize
the price of home output, the real wage, and therefore labor eﬀort. The home
portfolio is then structured to eliminate ￿uctuations in consumption.
With ￿xed exchange rates, by contrast, the price of home output and labor
employment ￿uctuate. An adverse shock to exports X, for example, lowers ￿ P
and ￿ L and increases leisure. Portfolios are structured ex ante so that when
leisure rises, consumption rises too. The ￿rm accomplishes this by issuing more
indexed debt than under ￿exible rates, so that there is a bigger capital gain
when ￿ P falls and the real exchange rate depreciates.
18Finally, the appendix shows that if both ￿xed and ￿exible exchange rates
are equilibria, ￿exible rates again yields higher welfare. In such a case, ￿xed
exchange rates may occur as a coordination failure: if agents expect ￿xing and
arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority will validate those
expectations, and social welfare will be ineﬃciently low. As in the case with
peso bonds, enabling the monetary authority to commit to a policy of ￿exible
rates would raise social welfare. Alternatively, direct controls on portfolio shares
could also be welfare-improving.
5F i n a l r e m a r k s
We have built a model in which both portfolio composition and monetary poli-
cies are determined optimally. A key implication is that, since optimal portfolios
depend on policy and viceversa, there may be more than one equilibrium policy
regime. This suggests that the fear of ￿oating that allegedly obtains in many
countries may be an artifact of arbitrary expectations. For certain parameter
values and shock distributions, expectations may be self-validating: if agents
expect ￿xing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority
will indeed deliver a ￿xed exchange rate. What the literature on fear of ￿oating
fails to take into account is that the same would happen if agents expected a
policy of ￿exible exchange rates: assets and liabilities would be denominated in
such a way as to make ￿oating optimal for the authorities.
Which equilibrium the economy lands on matters. We are able to show that
for plausible functional forms and lognormality of the shock, ￿exing delivers
higher expected social welfare than does ￿xing. Therefore, policies that anchor
expectations on the ￿exible rates outcome ￿or, alternatively, induce agents to
hold a portfolio that is compatible with ￿exing￿ raise social welfare.
One limitation of the analysis is that here portfolio composition is endoge-
nous, but only given the exogenous restrictions on the menu of assets. While
we have allowed for an asset menu that included more than the usual non-
contingent world currency bonds, it may be desirable and useful to derive mar-
ket incompleteness from more fundamental assumptions on the environment.
That remains a substantial task, however, and at this point we can only leave
it for future research.
A second limitation, of course, is that we have imposed strong restrictions
on the environment and policy options. These restrictions were justi￿ed on the
basis of tractability and analytical convenience, but obviously they will have to
be relaxed if the model is to be the basis for more realistic policy evaluation.
19A Appendix






















= ￿ L2 =( 1− α)(C∗ − E {X} + K)E {X}, (44)





= κ(C∗ − E {X} + K)E {X} − Γ (45)
where κ = 1
2
£




> 0 and Γ = 1
2 (C∗ − E {X} + K)(C∗ + K) >
0.
Under ￿xing, given that ﬂ C = X − K, wage setting equation 20 in the text
can be written as
Eﬂ L2 =( 1− α)E {(C∗ − X + K)X}.




= κE {(C∗ − X + K)X} − Γ.( 4 6 )
Comparing 45 and 46 we see that EU￿ex >E U ￿x requires






which always holds for non-degenerate X.
P r o o fo fc l a i ma tt h ee n do fs u b s e c t i o n4 . 1 .As w i t c hf r o m￿ex to ￿x implies






















































































































where from the second equality on we have assumed that logX is normal with
mean ￿ and variance σ2. The claim follows.
P r o o fo fc l a i m sa tt h ee n do fs u b s e c t i o n4 . 2 . Recall that with ￿xed rates,
consumption is given by (39), so its variance is:










(Va r X)(Va rX α)
‚
As w i t c ht o￿exible rates implies that consumption is given by (42), with
variance:





















(Va rX)(Va rX α)
‚
(47)
Assume again that logX ∼ N(￿,σ2). Then,
EXα = Eeαlog X = e￿+σ2/2























21Change variables and de￿ne z = eσ2
.N o t et h a tz depends on σ2,t h ev a r i a n c e
of logX,and is always greater than one. Replacing in 47 and simplifying one
￿nds that the sign of Va r ￿ C − Va r ﬂ C is given by the sign of
z1+α + zα(1+α) + z + zα2
− 2zα − 2z1+α2
We have not been able to ￿nd the sign of this polynomial analytically, but a
graph of the above expression for α in [0,1] and z>1 makes it obvious that the
sign is positive. It follows that a switch from ￿xt o￿ex increases the variance
of consumption.
To ￿nd the eﬀect of the switch on the expected cost of eﬀort, note that under











































=( 1+χ)(α − χ).




is equal to the sign of (α−χ), as claimed in the
text.
Now assume both ￿xa n d￿ex are equilibria and turn to the comparison of
￿ B∗ and ﬂ B∗. Clearly,









￿ Y = K − E {X}
while
ﬂ B∗ = K − E
' ﬂ P
“ ￿ B
= K − E
' ﬂ P







￿ B∗ − ﬂ B∗ =
Cov(X,Xα)
Va r(Xα)

















where the third equality follows from 48. So ﬂ B∗ < ￿ B∗ < 0. as claimed in the
text.
Finally, with quadratic utility, the same arguments as with nominal bonds
imply that
(1 − α)E {u0(C)X} = E
'
L2“
under both ￿ex and ￿x.














(C∗ − ￿ C)E {X},



















(C∗ − ﬂ C)X
“
(49)
But note that under ￿xed rates
ﬂ C = X − K + ﬂ B(E {Xα} − Xα)= ￿ C + Ω,
where
Ω ≡ ﬂ B (E {Xα} − Xα)+( X − E {X})























































Now recall ﬂ B =
Cov(Xα,X)





so expression 50 reduces to
￿









We conclude that ￿exing delivers higher expected welfare than ￿xing.
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